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ABSTRACT
Most items are sold to consumers by retail stores. Stores have two features that distinguish them
from auctions. First, the price is posted and a consumer who values the good at more than the posted
price is sold the good. Second, the sale takes place as soon as the consumer decides to buy. In
contrast, auctions have prices that are determined ex post and the potential consumer must wait until
the auction is held to buy the good.  Consequently, auctions result in "false trading", where buyers
sometimes pass up other valuable opportunities while waiting for the auction to occur or instead
make undesired duplicate purchases. Retail stores dominate auctions when the good is perishable
and/or becomes obsolete quickly, when the market is thin, and when close substitutes for the good
are plentiful. These predictions are consistent with a number of observed phenomena.
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Most goods are sold to consumers through retail stores, where a seller commits to sell at a
given price and where the good is sold as soon as the consumer decides to purchase. However,
it is commonly alleged that an auction should be run whenever the seller wants to maximize
the proceeds from selling a good that potential buyers value diﬀerently.1 The dominance of
auctions over stores is at variance with the real world observation that stores account for the
vast majority of sales to consumers.
Stores have two advantages over auctions, which account for their prevalence. Stores avoid
imposing waiting cost on consumers. In order to command a price premium above the reser-
vation price of the seller, any form of auction requires several bids to accumulate before it is
cleared. As a result, there is usually a certain waiting period between the time an auction
is announced (when the good would actually be available for sale) and the time the winner
is determined (when the good becomes available to the buyer).2 The second advantage that
stores possess is that they eliminate some uncertainty that is inherent in auctions. Consider a
buyer seeking to purchase a bottle of milk for his next breakfast. If milk were sold to consumers
by auction, the consumer would not know whether he made the winning bid or not until the
auction cleared. If he were to see another opportunity to purchase milk, either by store or
auction, he would face a dilemma. If he does not purchase the milk there, he runs a signiﬁcant
risk of not having milk the next morning. On the other hand, if he does purchase milk in the
store or chooses to bid on the second auction, he risks ending up with two bottles of milk.
Stores eliminate the “false trading” that is created by auctions where some buyers who would
agree to pay more than the market clearing price do not get the item and others who would
be unwilling (ex post) to pay as much as the clearing price are forced to buy the good because
they are locked in by the auction scheme.
Note that nothing in the deﬁnition of store requires a physical structure. An online store
ﬁts into the category of stores if it oﬀers to sell at a posted price and provides delivery within
a speciﬁed (generally short) time after the sale has been concluded.
1Milgrom (1987) shows that in a full-information setting, a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of the seller to the highest
valuation buyer extracts all the surplus. On the other hand, in the more realistic setting in which buyers’
valuations are private information, a sealed-bid auction with a minimum price maximizes the seller’s payoﬀ
among all possible exchange games.
2Of course, it is conceivable that actions are announced in advance of the good’s availability with a closing
at exactly the moment that the good becomes available. Such a strategy works in a deterministic world, but
not in one where supply has a stochastic component. Most of retailing deals with goods where at least some
component of good availability is random.
1The way auctions are designed in practice constitutes strong evidence of the relevance of this
false trading problem. Because bidders typically do not wish to submit bids too long before
the auction closes to avoid being locked in by the auction scheme, sellers typically choose to
run auctions that close at a pre-speciﬁed time and not after a certain number of bids has been
received. False trading also aﬀects bidding behavior. Indeed, in the context of online auctions,
it has been documented that a considerable proportion of bids arrive towards the end of the
auction, a phenomenon commonly known as sniping (Pinker et al. (2002)).3
Intuitively, one would expect waiting costs and the risk of false trading to make the store a
more appealing selling institution than auctions under most circumstances. This paper presents
a formal model conﬁrming this intuition. We model bidders’ waiting costs and the risk of false
trading by assuming that bidders having to wait for the auction to close will engage in a
search process to purchase the good elsewhere. When such a purchase opportunity is found, a
bidder that was originally planning to participate in the auction drops out. With fewer bidders
participating, the seller’s expected revenue from the auction falls. As a result, the costs imposed
on bidders by the auction get internalized by the seller and he is more likely to sell the good
using a store rather than an auction.
Our results show that the optimal choice of the store as opposed to the auction structure
is driven by a combination of three factors: (1) the extent to which the good being sold is
perishable, becomes obsolete quickly and/or the seller has a strong time preference, (2) the
thickness of the market, and (3) the size of bidders’ waiting costs and the extent to which
alternatives to purchase the good elsewhere are available. More speciﬁcally, we establish the
following results:
1. If the good is perishable, becomes obsolete quickly and/or the seller has a strong time
preference, then the store is preferred. Intuitively, this eﬀect arises because perishability
and discounting make it more costly for the seller to wait for additional bidders before
closing the auction. As a result, the optimal auction has a small expected number of
bidders, and the store dominates.
2. If the market is thick in the sense that the rate of bidder arrivals is high, the auction is
preferable. This eﬀect arises because when the rate of bidder arrivals is high, the gain in
expected selling price per unit time the seller waits before closing the auction is increased,
making it worthwhile to wait for a large number of bidders.
3The observation itself does not necessarily imply that waiting costs are central. It is also possible that
another sort of strategic behavior explains sniping.
23. If bidders’ waiting costs are high and/or substitutes for the good are readily available,
then the store is preferred. This is because those buyers who arrive before the auction’s
closing time are reluctant to wait, and either leave or search for an alternative. As a result,
the auction is unable to achieve the level of bidder participation required to command a
premium over the posted price. In the context of this point, the eﬀects of both elasticities
of demand and supply can be analyzed. When either side of the market has high degrees
of elasticity, goods will be sold in retail stores.
An important implication of our analysis is that the optimal way to sell similar goods can
diﬀer, depending on the environment. For example, the thickness of a market can have a
decisive impact on the choice between store and auction, with thin markets using stores and
thick markets auctions to sell the same goods. Furthermore, seemingly identical goods can be
sold either through a store or an auction depending on the degree of availability of substitutes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the store. Section 2
considers the properties of the optimal auction. Section 3 compares the two selling institutions
and derives conditions under which each of those forms dominates. Section 4 concludes. Proofs
of the propositions are in the Appendix.
1 The Store
Consider a risk-neutral seller trying to sell a single unit of an indivisible good using a store. He
announces a listing price p for the good; the ﬁrst customer that agrees to pay the listed price
gets the good.
Potential customers arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity ¸, implying that the
customer interarrival time is exponentially distributed with parameter ¸. Each potential buyer
i has a valuation vi for the good, which is random, independent of other buyers’ valuations and
has distribution function F and density f with support [v;v]. The customer buys the good if
vi > p. If his valuation is below p, the good remains available for sale to another customer.
Let ® > 0 denote the discount rate for this problem, which can be interpreted either as the
seller’s time preference, as the extent to which the item being sold is perishable, or as the speed
with which it becomes obsolete.4 Let 0 · R < v denote the seller’s reservation utility if the good
4In the ﬁrst interpretation, all amounts received by the seller are simply discounted at a rate ®. In the second
and third interpretation, bidders’ valuations for the good would be decaying exponentially through time, with
a time-dependent distribution F(v;t) rescaled so as to lie on the support [e¡®tv;e¡®tv] (the same would apply
3goes unsold. In the spirit of dynamic programming, R can be viewed as summarizing the entire
future of the problem (except for the eﬀect of obsolescence, perishability and discounting, which
is captured by e¡®t). It could represent either the utility the seller derives from consuming the
good himself, or the expected revenue from a subsequent sale.
The store owner’s problem is to set a price schedule fptg that maximizes the expected revenue
from the sale, ΠS. Given pt and the distribution of buyers’ valuations, for any customer walking
into the store at time t, the good will be sold with probability 1 ¡ F(pt). Thus, the store’s
expected revenue is pt(1 ¡ F(pt)). With probability F(pt), the good will not be sold, and the








¡¸t (pt(1 ¡ F(pt)) + F(pt)R)dt (1)
where ¸e¡¸t is the density of interarrival times and e¡®t captures the eﬀect of perishability and
discounting. With R given, one can do no better than maximizing pt(1¡F(pt))+F(pt)R time
by time, yielding the ﬁrst-order condition
1 ¡ F(pt) ¡ ptf(pt) + f(pt)R = 0 (2)
which immediately implies that pt is a constant independent of time, p¤, satisfying the usual
hazard rate formula,5
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Note that since p¤ = R +
1¡F(p¤)
f(p¤) > R, on has p¤(1 ¡ F(p¤)) + F(p¤)R > R and therefore
ΠS > ¸
®+¸R. As a result, there exists some ®¤ > 0 such that the seller derives more than his
reservation utility from selling the good whenever ® < ®¤. This result, which will be important
below, is summarized in the following proposition:
to the reservation utility R). Both of these cases can be handled with minor modiﬁcations of the formulation
used below and yield similar conclusions.
5Lazear (1986) describes the optimal time path of prices when the seller faces uncertainty about the market
for the item being sold. His results diﬀer because in his model, the number of consumers is ﬁnite and they have
common valuations.
4Proposition 1: Let p¤ = R +
1¡F(p¤)
f(p¤) . Then, for all ® < ®¤ ´ ¸
(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤))
R , the seller’s
expected utility from the sale, ΠS, is strictly greater than his reservation utility R.
Proposition 1 has the immediate implication that if the discount rate ® is very high (either
because the seller has a very high time preference, the good is highly perishable or becomes
obsolete quickly), then the seller will not even attempt to sell the good and prefer to consume
it himself. It follows trivially that attempting a sale is always optimal if R = 0.
2 The Auction
2.1 The Model
Suppose now that the seller decides to sell the good using an auction. He announces a reserva-
tion price p and the auction’s closing time T.6 Individuals who arrive before T are allowed to
submit bids for the good. At time T, the highest bidder gets the good at a price equal to the
second-highest bid or the reservation price p, whichever is greater.7
Not all arrivals result in bids because the necessity of waiting until T imposes an additional
cost on bidders. This is captured by allowing alternative purchase opportunities that are
idiosyncratic to each bidder to arrive exponentially at rate ¹ for each individual bidder engaged
in the search process.8 In practice, the value of ¹ will depend positively on two factors, each
having its own economic interpretation: on how important immediacy of the purchase is to
bidders (with high direct waiting costs leading them to search for alternatives more intensively
or to decide to purchase goods that are inferior to the one being auctioned), and on the extent to
6Although an auction with a ﬁxed closing time is used in the analysis, the results below hold equally true
under the alternative assumption that the auction closes after a certain number of bids has been received. This
follows from the fact, established in proposition 2 below, that the seller’s expected proceeds are increasing and
concave both in the actual and in the expected number of bidders participating in the auction.
7Given the equivalence theorem for independent private value auctions (Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981),
Riley and Samuelson (1981)), this assumption is innocuous for the optimality of the auction as opposed to the
store in the setting considered here, but simpliﬁes the exposition as bidders bid their true valuation.
8This assumption is made for expositional convenience. All that is required for the results below to hold is
that the probability that a bidder drops out from the auction be an increasing function of the time he must
wait before the auction closes. However, it is worth noting that assuming an exponential distribution is not
unrealistic. It corresponds to the limiting case of a situation in which searching bidders visit a certain number
of places per unit time until the auction closes and there is a certain probability that they ﬁnd a suitable good
in each of these places. (Note that the good need not be strictly identical to the one being auctioned, as some
bidders will choose to purchase an inferior alternative because they do not want to wait.)
5which substitutes for the good being auctioned exist (which, with some qualiﬁcations discussed
below, would generally be high for commodity products and low for original artwork). Note
that if many substitutes exist, then the probability that bidders ﬁnd an alternative by time T
is high and so would be the risk of false trading if bidders chose to submit their bids as soon
as they arrive at the auction (i.e., before searching for alternatives).9
The number of bidders that participate in the auction at time T, N, equals the number of
bidder arrivals minus the number of bidders that have found an alternative by time T. Thus,




(1 ¡ exp(¡¹T)) (6)










¡¹T > 0 (8)
and
@2˜ ¸(T)
@T 2 = ¡¸¹e
¡¹T < 0 (9)
the expected number of bidders participating in the auction is an increasing but concave func-
tion of the auction’s closing time. This eﬀect arises because some of the bidders ﬁnd an
alternative and drop out from the auction. As will be shown shortly, it is this phenomenon
which potentially makes the auction inferior to the store as a selling institution and explains the
dominance of the latter in practice. Note that if bidders do not have outside options (¹ ! 0),
˜ ¸(T) ! ¸T.
















(1 ¡ exp(¡¹T)) > 0 (11)
9At the time this decision is made, the actual price at which the auction will clear is unknown, so the
consumer must implicitly solve the stochastic problem and calculate the expected utility to waiting for the
auction.
6Thus, the higher the drop out rate, the lower the expected number of bidders participating
in the auction at any given time T and the higher the arrival rate, the greater the expected
number of bidders. Furthermore, limT!1 ˜ ¸(T) = ¸=¹, so that the number of bidders as time
goes to inﬁnity is just the potential bidder arrival rate divided by the departure rate among
actual bidders.
The seller’s expected payoﬀ from auctioning the good at time T, ΠA(T), is equal to the
present value of the expectation over N of the revenue from an auction with N bidders, ¼N:
ΠA(T) = e
¡®TE(¼Nj˜ ¸(T)) (12)
where ® again denotes the discount rate. The seller’s problem is to select an auctioning time
T and a reservation price p so as to maximize this expression.
Wang (1993) shows that the expected revenue from the auction conditional on receiving N











N¡1(y)(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy (13)
where J(y) ´ y ¡
1¡F(y)
f(y) denotes the Bulow and Roberts (1989) marginal revenue function.
Equation (13) is the standard result that the expected utility from an auction is equal to the
expectation of the maximum of the highest bidder’s marginal revenue and reservation utility
(see Bulow and Klemperer (1996)). Note that because it is the expectation of the second highest
order statistic of bidders’ valuations, ¼N is an increasing and concave function of N.
Taking the ﬁrst-order condition on (13), the optimal reservation price p¤ solves J(p¤) = R,
or, using the deﬁnition of J,
p




Note that consistent with the Riley and Samuelson (1981) result, the optimal reservation price
p¤ does not depend on the number of bidders participating in the auction and is identical to
the store’s posted price.
Letting ¼(˜ ¸(T)) ´ E(¼Nj˜ ¸(T)), the seller’s expected utility from an auction taking place at
time T can be written as
ΠA(T) = e








7Using the expression for ¼N, and as shown in Wang (1993), one can rewrite ¼(˜ ¸(T)) in an












N¡1(y)(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy + R
1
A




¡˜ ¸(T)(1¡F(y))(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy (16)
Another helpful result for the subsequent analysis is that the properties of ¼N, which is
an increasing and concave function of N, carry over to ¼(˜ ¸), and therefore to the auction’s
expected payoﬀ.
Proposition 2: ¼(˜ ¸) = E(¼Nj˜ ¸) is increasing and concave in ˜ ¸.
The larger the number of actual bidders at time T, the higher are proﬁts. But proﬁts increase
at a decreasing rate in the number of bidders because the second highest order statistic is an
increasing, but concave function of the number of observations in a sample, in this case, the
number of bidders.
Note that since ˜ ¸(T) is strictly increasing and concave in T, proposition 2 implies that the
expected (undiscounted) revenue from the auction, ¼(˜ ¸(T)), will be strictly increasing and





















@T 2 < 0 (18)
This property again follows from the nature of ¼N as the expectation of the second highest
order statistic of bidders’ valuations.
2.2 Properties of the Optimal Auction
At this point, a slight digression is useful. We consider the properties of an optimal auction
and how they vary with the discount rate, the arrival rate of bidders, and the availability of
alternatives. The purpose is not so much to characterize auctions, but rather as a foundation
for understanding why retail stores dominate even the best auction under a large variety of
circumstances.
8Choosing the auction’s optimal closing time T ¤ involves a tradeoﬀ for the seller: on the one
hand, a higher T increases the expected number of bidders participating in the auction, ˜ ¸(T)
and therefore the expected revenue from the sale ¼(˜ ¸(T)). On the other hand, as the closing
time T is increased, discounting reduces the present value of the proceeds. The optimal closing
time T ¤ is the one that balances these two eﬀects.
As in the case of the store, if the discount rate is very high, the seller will decide to consume
the good himself rather than trying to auction it. In the context of the auction, this translates
to an optimal closing time of 0. More speciﬁcally, one can establish the following result:
Proposition 3: If the discount rate exceeds ®¤ ´ ¸
R v
p (J(y)¡R)f(y)dy
R , then the seller prefers
not to auction the good.
The economic intuition behind proposition 3 is the following: if the discount rate lies above
the instantaneous proportional gain from auctioning the good (which is equal to the product of




R ), it is not worth running an auction, and the seller prefers consuming the
good himself (trivially, a sale is again always optimal if R = 0). If the discount rate lies below
®¤, then it is worth for the seller to wait some positive time T before closing the auction, hoping
that at least one bidder will show up. Note also that as the rate of bidder arrivals ¸ increases,
so does the critical value ®¤ and the seller is more likely to attempt a sale.






















(p¤ ¡ R)(1 ¡ F(p¤))
R
(19)
Thus, whenever ® ¸ ®¤, there is no attempt to sell the good, and neither store nor auction are
run. In what follows, we therefore assume that ® < ®¤, so that the seller does attempt a sale
and the question of which structure is preferable (i.e., store or auction) becomes relevant. We
now show that if attempting a sale is optimal, the auction has an unique optimal closing time
T ¤:
Proposition 4: Whenever 0 < ® < ®¤, there exists a unique T ¤ > 0 maximizing the
auction’s expected proceeds ΠA(T).
9The results in propositions 3 and 4 arise because of the tradeoﬀ between waiting for more
bidders to show up (which increases the expected revenue from the auction at time T) and
the eﬀect of discounting (which reduces its present value). Note that in the special case in
which ® ! 0, it is optimal for the seller to wait a very long time before closing the auction.
Provided that ¸ À ¹, expected bidder participation in the optimal auction will be very high,
and ΠA ! v.
The next result demonstrates that changes in the discount rate ®, the rate of bidder arrivals
¸ and the availability of outside options ¹ have an unambiguous impact on the proceeds of the
auction.
Proposition 5: ΠA(T ¤) is strictly decreasing in the discount rate ® and the availability of
outside options ¹ and strictly increasing in market thickness ¸.
The next three results characterize the properties of the optimal auction as a function of
the discount rate ®, the rate of bidder arrivals ¸ and the availability of outside options ¹.
When varying ¸ and ¹, the optimal expected number of bidders chosen by the seller, ˜ ¸(T ¤)
is a more appropriate description of the seller’s auctioning strategy than the auction’s closing
time T ¤, which by itself does not say much about how the auction will look like in terms of
bidder participation. Rather than the auction’s optimal closing time T ¤, the following results
therefore consider the eﬀect of changes in ®, ¸ and ¹ on the optimal ˜ ¸(T ¤).
Proposition 6: The expected number of bidders in the optimal auction, ˜ ¸(T ¤), is decreas-
ing in the discount rate ®, increasing in the bidder arrival rate ¸, and decreasing in the rate of
arrival of outside options ¹.
The results on the properties of the optimal auction in proposition 6 make intuitive sense.
When the discount rate ® is low, so that waiting for more bidders is not too costly, the seller
increases the expected number of bidders in the optimal auction, ˜ ¸. Similarly, if the arrival rate
¸ is high, so that the market is thick, then waiting for one additional bidder entails a lower cost,
and the seller increases the expected number of bidders in the optimal auction. Finally, if ¹ is
high, so that bidders’ waiting costs are high or alternatives for the good are easy to ﬁnd, it is
more costly to accumulate bidders and the expected number of bidders in the optimal auction
is reduced.
There is an important diﬀerence between the impact of the discount rate ® and that of the
arrival and departure rates ¸ and ¹. In the case of changes in the discount rate, there is a
10monotonic relationship between the expected number of bidders ˜ ¸ and the auction’s optimal
closing time T ¤. Waiting longer or waiting for more bidders amount to the same thing, and
the auction’s optimal closing time is unambiguously decreasing in ®. On the other hand, in
the case of ¸ and ¹, proposition 6 allows to make predictions about the expected number of
bidders participating in the auction but not about the auction’s closing time T. Closing time
and number of bidders can move in opposite directions when these parameters are varied, as
the following numerical example illustrates. Suppose that bidders’ valuations are uniformly
distributed on the interval [0;1]. Then, the reservation price is given by p¤ = (1 + R)=2, and
one has











dy = 1 ¡ 2




Therefore, using the fact that T = ¡ln(1¡ ˜ ¸¹=¸)=¹, the expected proﬁt from the auction can
be expressed as a function of ˜ ¸ as
ΠA(˜ ¸) =
³











Figure 1 depicts the optimal expected number of bidders in the auction ˜ ¸(T ¤) (upper panel)
and the corresponding closing time T ¤ (lower panel) as a function of the arrival rate ¸. Note
that as the arrival rate increases, so does the optimal expected number of bidders. However,
the optimal length of the auction T ¤ falls. Intuitively, when the arrival rate is high, it is less
costly to acquire additional bidders. The seller takes some of the reduced cost in the form of
more bidders, and some in the form of a lower T ¤, which has value to him because of a positive
discount rate.
The analysis in this section implies that whenever ® or ¹ are high or ¸ is low, the expected
number of bidders in the auction ˜ ¸ will be low. But then, the probability of having more than
one bidder show up in the auction will be low as well, and the auction will look more like a
store in the limit. Intuitively, one would therefore expect the store to dominate the auction for
high ® and ¹ and for low ¸.10 The next section shows that this is indeed the case.
10It is worth noting that given the equivalence in proposition 2, this result would follow immediately if an
auction closing after a given number of bids N have been received had been used in the analysis instead of
an auction closing at a ﬁxed time T. In this case, the store is just the corner case of an auction in which the
number of bids before clearing is 1.




























































Figure 1: Optimal expected number of bidders in the auction ˜ ¸(T ¤) and
the corresponding closing time T ¤ (value of the parameters: ® = 1,
R = 0, ¹ = 1).
3 The Optimal Market Structure
We now turn to the question of which market structure – store or auction – will be optimal
for the seller. We ﬁrst present a general condition under which the auction can dominate the
store. In a second step, we show how the optimality of the store or the auction depends on the
seller’s time preference and the extent to which the good is perishable (®), the thickness of the
market (¸) and the extent of waiting costs and availability of outside options (¹).
Proposition 7: The auction is the preferred structure if and only if there exists some
˜ ¸ 2]0;¸=¹[ (for ¹ 6= 0) or some ˜ ¸ > 0 (for ¹ = 0) such that
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The intuition for proposition 7 is the following. The store has the advantage that no waiting
is necessary between the time that a good is spotted and consumed. It also has the advantage
12that once the good is discovered, it can be consumed with certainty as long as the seller’s
demand price is paid. In order for an auction to dominate a store, other factors must oﬀset
these advantages. The conditions are ﬁrst that a suﬃcient number of bidders ˜ ¸ must be
able to accumulate in order for ¼(˜ ¸) to rise signiﬁcantly above the expected payoﬀ from the
store. The maximum achievable expected number of bidders in the auction, limT!1 ˜ ¸ = ¸=¹,
depends positively on market thickness ¸ and negatively on the drop-out rate ¹. Second,
this accumulation must occur suﬃciently quickly so that the payoﬀ from the auction does not
get discounted too heavily. As is apparent from the expressions T = ¡ln(1 ¡ ˜ ¸¹=¸)=¹, this
accumulation will occur faster, the higher ¸ and the lower ¹. Thus, fast arrivals and slow
defections positively aﬀect both factors required for the auction to dominate the store.
Waiting until more potential consumers arrive has social advantages because the good is
more likely to get into the “right” hands, i.e., to the consumer in society who attaches the
highest value to the good. The disadvantage is that all prior bidders and the seller must wait
for additional time to pass, which imposes a real cost. Of course, the value of getting the good
into the right hands will be higher the more dispersed buyers’ valuations.
Similar tradeoﬀs between the price obtained and the relative costs of running stores and
auctions underly many of the results in the existing literature. For example, De Vany (1987)
compares stores, time-based auctions (which close after a ﬁxed time has elapsed) and thickness-
based auctions (which close once a certain number of bids has been received) from the per-
spective of transactions costs. He shows that the higher expected selling price in both auction
forms can be oﬀset by their higher transactions costs, which, in his model, are captured by
the seller’s holding cost and the buyers’ inspection and waiting cost.11 As a result of these
higher transactions costs, the store tends to dominate the two auctioning schemes when the
distribution of buyer valuations is not too diﬀuse, while the auction tends to be the preferred
structure when this dispersion is high. Wang (1993) focuses on the explicit costs of running
stores and auctions. He shows that the advantage of running auctions periodically instead of
selling goods in stores arises when the storage costs incurred by the auction are lower than the
displaying costs incurred by a store, which is his working assumption. He also establishes the
result that auctions tend to dominate stores when the dispersion of buyers’ valuations is high.12
By contrast, our focus is on the tradeoﬀ between a higher expected selling price and waiting
costs. Waiting costs aﬀect the seller through two channels: perishability and bidder defections.
Faster arrivals and slower departures reduce the impact of each and thus tend to favor the
11Although De Vany computes bidders’ waiting cost explicitly in his analysis, he does not allow bidders facing
high waiting costs to search for alternatives and defect from the auction.
12Wang (1998) extends some of these results to a correlated private values setting.



































Figure 2: The choice between store (solid line) and auction (dotted line)
depending on market thickness ¸ and waiting costs ¹ (value of the pa-
rameters: ® = 1, R = 0, f¸;¹g 2 ff5;1g;f5;2:5g;f10;1gg).
auction. This can be illustrated using a numerical example. Suppose again that bidders’
valuations are uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]. Then, using (21) and the fact that
the optimal price for the store is the same as for the auction, p¤ = (1+R)=2, the condition for
the auction to dominate is that there exists a ˜ ¸ such that
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The expected revenue from the auction as a function of ˜ ¸ and the expected revenue of the store
are depicted in Figure 2 for three diﬀerent situations. In the base case with ¸ = 5 and ¹ = 1
(top panel), the auction (dotted line) slightly dominates the store (solid line) if a ˜ ¸ around 2 is
selected. If the drop-out rate ¹ is increased to 2:5 (middle panel), then the auction no longer
dominates the store: no ˜ ¸ can be found such that (22) is satisﬁed. Finally, if the arrival rate ¸
is increased to 10 (lower panel), the auction dominates the store more clearly than in the base
case.
This example suggests that a high market thickness ¸ and low availability of substitutes ¹
should make dominance of the auction more likely. The next two propositions show that this
intuition is correct.
14Proposition 8: For all parameter constellations (®;¹) such that selling is optimal (® < ®¤),
there exists a rate of bidder arrivals ¸0 such that auctioning is optimal if ¸ > ¸0.
The intuition for proposition 8 is clear. What matters for the seller’s choice is the cost of
waiting for additional bidders. When the rate of bidder arrivals is high, this cost is low because
many bidders will accumulate even if the auction’s closing time is set early. Thus, the seller
decides to run an auction rather than a store to take advantage of the higher expected selling
price in the auction.13 An interesting implication of proposition 8 is that the optimal way to
sell the same good, with the same distribution of bidder valuations and the same perishability
®, can be either a store or an auction depending on the thickness of the market.
Anecdotal empirical evidence is completely in line with this analysis. For example, the
market for fresh ﬁsh and the Amsterdam fresh ﬂower market, which are characterized by high
levels of thickness (with all interested bidders showing up every morning at the announced
time to bid), are typically run using auctions. At the retail level, where the rate of arrivals is
low, however, those same goods are sold using posted prices.14 The real estate market provides
another instructive example. Houses are most commonly sold using posted prices. When the
market is very thick, however, auctions are commonly used. Such a switch from posted prices
to auctions has been observed in the California real-estate market in the late 1990’s.
Turning to the impact of bidders’ waiting cost and false trading, the next result shows that
if the drop-out rate ¹ is high, the seller will always prefer a store.
Proposition 9: For all parameter constellations (®;¸) such that selling is optimal (® < ®¤),
there exists a drop out rate ¹0 such that the seller always prefers the store to the auction if
¹ > ¹0.
13Of course, the cost of obtaining additional oﬀers from buyers can arise from sources other than the good’s
perishability and previous arrivals’ defections. Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) and McAfee and McMillan (1988)
consider the eﬀect of communication costs in settings in which the seller must bear a ﬁxed cost for each new
buyer that he contacts. Riley and Zeckauser (1983) demonstrate that relative to any haggling strategy, a
posted price maximizes seller proﬁts. McAfee and McMillan (1988) show that the auction is optimal when
the communication cost is zero. When the communication cost is nonzero, the seller ﬁrst approaches potential
buyers sequentially. If he exhausts the entire set of potential buyers, he sells to the buyer with the highest
valuation. In the limiting case of inﬁnitely many potential buyers, the optimal mechanism is a posted price.
Arnold and Lippman (1995) consider the role of the number of units up for sale and demonstrate that auctions
are preferred when the number of items is large, and posted prices when it is small.
14It is true, however, that the posted price is not the typical selling price. But the feature that is crucial for
this analysis is that there is no time in the future until which a potential buyer is forced to wait before the sale
is actualized.
15The result in Proposition 9 demonstrates that the speed at which bidders ﬁnd an alternative
plays a critical role in the choice between store and auction. The higher bidders’ waiting costs
and the easier alternatives can be found, the more likely a store will be used.15 Again, this
result is completely in line with what one observes in practice. For instance, groceries, for
which waiting costs are high (since immediacy is important to buyers) and alternatives very
easy to ﬁnd, are sold using stores. Rembrandt paintings, for which immediacy is not important
to buyers and alternatives are very diﬃcult to ﬁnd, are usually sold by auction, while artwork
of less famous artists, for which alternatives are easier to ﬁnd, is exposed in art galleries and
sold by what is essentially a posted price. Paintings by the same artist are sold using one or
the other structure at diﬀerent stages in his career. Indeed, at the beginning of his career,
Picasso’s paintings were commonly sold in art galleries, but are nowadays most commonly sold
by auction.
Much the same observation applies to antiques: most items are sold at ﬁxed price, but truly
unique items for which substitutes are diﬃcult to ﬁnd are sold by auction. Luxury goods,
such as jewels and gold watches, provide another illustration along similar lines. Most are sold
at a ﬁxed price because similar items can be found elsewhere. Truly unique pieces for which
substitutes are very diﬃcult to ﬁnd, such as Faberge eggs and antique watches, are usually sold
by auction.
Commodities provide another interesting application of this analysis. Cash-settled commod-
ity futures contracts, which are homogeneous, are usually traded on centralized exchanges using
double auctions, which are essentially posted prices, since trades are executed as soon as a bid
or oﬀer is accepted.16 On the other hand, commodities for physical delivery at a certain place
and day, for which substitutes are diﬃcult to ﬁnd, are usually sold by auction among the dif-
ferent potential buyers present at a given location. Indeed, the availability of substitutes plays
such an important role in physical commodities trading that traders commonly maintain maps
locating the diﬀerent ships containing a given commodity on the walls of their oﬃce. Note that
as in the case of the arrival rate, two goods with identical distributions of bidder valuations
can be sold optimally either using a store or an auction, depending on the size of waiting costs
and whether alternative purchase opportunities are available to the bidders or not.
Much of this can be put in familiar terms of elasticity. The elasticity of demand is high when
15A related result is obtained by Ehrman and Peters (1993). Considering a setting in which buyers have a
certain alternative that yields them a sure surplus, they show that the auction dominates when this surplus is
zero. When this surplus is high, a posted price-like scheme will be preferred by the seller.
16See De Vany (1987) for a more detailed discussion of the fact that double auctions are closer to posted
prices than to auctions.
16good substitutes are available. The availability of good substitutes depends on low search costs
and on the existence of other products that can do approximately the same thing as the one
in question. The elasticity of supply being high means that there are many identical goods
available at close to the same price. In the example of non-perishables that are produced by
many ﬁrms in an industry with free entry, it is diﬃcult to imagine that auctions could survive.
With low search costs, no seller could receive more than marginal cost because consumers would
always have a ready alternative, namely, buying the same good from another seller. Under such
circumstances, the supply to any given buyer would be perfectly elastic at the market price,
which can be thought of as having an inﬁnite rate of arrival of alternatives.17
New goods have higher supply elasticities than used ones. In an extreme case, the supply of a
“used” good, such as a particular Picasso painting is completely inelastic and good substitutes
are diﬃcult to ﬁnd. New goods, such as a particular digital camera, are supplied more elastically.
Auctions are more common for used goods than they are for new ones. This is true even in
electronic markets like eBay. Used items or those inelastically supplied such as rare antiques, are
sold primarily by auctions, whereas new ones, such as a particular book that can be produced
at almost constant marginal cost, are sold through stores.
Proposition 9 does imply that a higher drop out rate ¹ makes the use of posted prices more
likely, but it does not allow a precise characterization of when an auction or a store will be
preferred. The next proposition puts a much tighter bound on the parameter constellations
under which auctions can arise as optimal selling institutions.









(p¤¡R)(1¡F(p¤)) cannot dominate a store.
Proposition 10 implies that for the auction to be able to dominate the store, a minimum
expected number of bidders ˜ ¸ is required in the auction. This is because the beneﬁt of using
an auction as opposed to a store stems from the fact that a price higher than the reservation
17Although our analysis is cast in terms of availability of outside alternatives, similar eﬀects arise when a
monopoly seller faces capacity constraints in production. Harris and Raviv (1981) demonstrate that when the
ﬁrm can produce as many units of output as desired at constant cost, the optimal selling mechanism is a ﬁxed
price, whereas an auction with a reserve price will be preferred if the capacity constraint is binding (i.e., if the
number of potential buyers exceeds the capacity constraint). Along similar lines, Milgrom (1989) notes that
posted prices are commonly used for standardized, inexpensive items sold in stores and for which all comers can
be served, when it is too expensive to gather the competing buyers together or if the timing of buyer demands
varies. On the other hand, when goods are not standardized or when the market clearing prices are highly
unstable, auctions are preferred.



























Figure 3: Minimum value of ˜ ¸ below which the store is always preferred
to the auction (value of the parameters: ® = 1, R = 0, ¸ 2 f5;10g).
price p¤ can be extracted. This, however, can only occur if the average number of bidders is
suﬃciently high.
Proposition 10 is best illustrated using a numerical example. Suppose again that that bid-
ders’ valuations are uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]. Using the fact that p¤ =





































































2 are depicted in Figure 3 for ¸ = 5 and ¸ = 10. Note that
the minimum expected number of bidders in the auction ˜ ¸ below which the store will be the
preferred structure becomes larger, the larger the arrival rate ¸. This is because the store
becomes more proﬁtable as ¸ is increased.
18The result of proposition 10 is related to proposition 7 but somewhat weaker, as the eﬀect of
the time required for bidders to accumulate on the value of the sale is not taken explicitly into
account. Nevertheless, it is a very convenient starting point to derive results that allow to rule
out the dominance of auctions in many circumstances. The reason is that the rate ¹ at which
bidders ﬁnd alternatives constrains the maximum expected number of bidders ˜ ¸ that the seller
can achieve in an auction not to exceed ¸=¹. Therefore, knowing that there exists a critical ˜ ¸
below which the store will dominate the auction, and since ˜ ¸ is a strictly decreasing function
of ¹, a corresponding value for ¹ above which it is certain that the store will be preferred to
the auction can be determined:






, the store dominates the auction.
Proposition 11 conﬁrms the basic intuition that running an auction, which requires a large
number of bidders to work well, becomes less interesting than the store if bidders are not ready
to wait because they can ﬁnd opportunities to purchase the good elsewhere. It also implies that
regardless of the distribution of bidders’ valuations, if both the discount rate ® and the bidder
arrival rate ¸ are reduced proportionally, the value of ¹ above which the store is guaranteed to
dominate the auction falls by the same proportion.
To understand the basic intuition behind proposition 11, is instructive to consider the limiting
case in which the discount rate is very low. In such a setting, ignoring outside options would
lead to the recommendation that an auction should be run. However, using the condition in
proposition 11 and L’Hospital’s rule, a suﬃcient condition for the store to dominate the auction
when ® ! 0 is that ¹ > ¸. The reason is that if this condition is satisﬁed, the average time
1=¹ until bidders ﬁnd an alternative to purchase the good elsewhere is lower than the average
bidder interarrival time, 1=¸. As a result, the probability of having two bidders if an auction
is run is very low and the seller prefers to sell the good using a store.
What matters is how the departure rate compares to the arrival rate. Whenever the former
exceeds the latter, an auction is unable to achieve the number of bidders required to command
a premium over the store and will therefore not be selected by the seller. Again, groceries
and artwork from famous artists constitute a case in point. The arrival rate on groceries is
much higher than on Rembrandt paintings, but substitutes are so easy to ﬁnd that the store is
preferred. The arrival rate on Rembrandt paintings is very low, but alternatives are so diﬃcult
to ﬁnd that the auction can be used.
The next result shows that if the discount rate is suﬃciently low, the auction will be the
preferred structure.
19Proposition 12: Suppose that ¸ À ¹. There exists some ®0 > 0 so that the auction
dominates the store for ® < ®0.
Note that a value of ˜ ¸ strictly (and possibly signiﬁcantly) above 1 must be achievable for the
auction to dominate for low ®. The reason is that because of the concavity of ¼(˜ ¸), Jensen’s
inequality implies that ¼(1) < ¼1, and the auction cannot dominate the store if ˜ ¸ < 1. As a
result, the condition ¸ > ¹ would not be suﬃcient to guarantee that the auction dominates the
store, and ¸ À ¹ is required.
Proposition 12 implies that other things equal, goods that are perishable or become obsolete
quickly should be sold using stores rather than auctions, while goods whose value does not fall
too quickly through time should be sold using auctions. This prediction is consistent with the
empirical evidence. Artwork is hardly perishable and sold by auction, while fresh vegetables are
typically sold in stores. Again, it is important to note that it is not the rate of perishability as
such that will drive the choice between both forms of sale, but how it compares to the arrival
rate. Fresh ﬂowers provide a nice illustration. They are equally perishable at the wholesale
and at the retail level. At the retail level, the arrival rate is low, and the store is preferred. At
the wholesale level, however, the market is thicker and auctions are preferred.
4 Summary and Conclusion
Auctions have the undesirable feature that they impose waiting costs on bidders and give rise
to false trading. As a result, the seller will often prefer running a retail store to running an
auction. Three factors are shown to play a critical role in the seller’s choice between store and
auction: (1) the perishability of the good and discounting, (2) the thickness of the market, and
(3) the extent of buyers’ waiting costs and the availability of alternatives. More speciﬁcally,
the following can be established:
1. If the seller’s time preference, the perishability of the good being sold or the speed at
which it becomes obsolete are high, then the store tends to be the preferred structure.
2. If the market is very thick in the sense that many bidders arrive per unit time, the auction
tends to be preferred to the store.
3. High bidders’ waiting costs and the availability of alternatives to purchase an identical or
similar good elsewhere tend to favor the store.
20An important implication of our analysis is that none of these factors alone can explain why a
given form of sale is selected in practice. Rather, what is important is their relative magnitude.
Perishable items can be sold by auction if the arrival rate is high, while nonperishable items
may be sold by auction if the market is thin. In the same way, goods for which alternatives are
diﬃcult to ﬁnd may be sold in stores if the arrival rate is low, and goods for which substitutes
are easily available by auction if the arrival rate is high. The immediate consequence is that
identical goods may be sold in diﬀerent ways depending on the market environment. In an
environment in which arrivals are frequent and alternatives diﬃcult to ﬁnd, the good will be
sold using an auction. However, the store may be the optimal structure to sell the same good
if the arrival rate is low and alternatives are hard to ﬁnd.
The development of markets on the Internet provides an interesting application of this analy-
sis. At ﬁrst sight, the Internet would seem to favor auctions because it allows the arrival streams
of almost the whole world to be pooled together (at least for goods that can be shipped). On
the other hand, Internet technology makes searching for alternatives much easier, which tends
to favor stores. This explains why stores have become more and more common on the Internet
in the last few years, with even originally all-auction electronic marketplaces such as eBay now
allowing sellers to run retail stores rather than auctions.
The Internet actually provides an interesting laboratory to assess the impact of the diﬀerent
factors studied in this paper. As mentioned in Pinker et al. (2002), the Internet has reduced
explicit auctioning costs to such an extent that almost anything can now be sold online.18
Accordingly, ﬁrms have been experimenting auctions and posted prices with various goods. An
example is Priceline, which made an abortive attempt to run grocery auctions. By emphasizing
the role of immediacy and the availability of substitutes, this paper makes clear why auctions
were inappropriate in this setting.
To some extent, the Internet may allow to disentangle the impact of the diﬀerent factors.
Consider for example immediacy and false trading. Internet auctions and stores will both fail
if immediacy is very important to buyers. If immediacy is not too important but false trading
is, then Internet stores will succeed and Internet auctions will fail. The appearance of “buy
now” prices on many Internet auction sites reﬂects the relative importance of these factors.
18Lucking-Reiley (2000) ﬁnds that auctioneer fees are much lower on the Internet than in traditional auctions.
As noted in Pinker et al. (2002), this supports the view that the Internet has made auctioning more accessible.
21A Distribution of the Number of Bids at time T
In this appendix, we derive the distribution of the number of bidders participating in the auction
at time T. To do so, the auction is best viewed as a queuing system in which customers arrive
at a rate ¸ and each customer in the system leaves at a rate ¹. Let qN(t) denote the probability
that there are N bidders in the system at time t. These probabilities must satisfy the following
system of Chapman-Kolmogorov diﬀerential equations:
dq0(t)
dt
= ¡¸q0(t) + ¹q1(t); (N = 0) (25)
dqN(t)
dt
= ¡(¸ + N¹)qN(t) + (N + 1)¹qN+1(t) + ¸qN¡1(t); (N > 0) (26)
The intuition behind this system is the following: if the system is currently empty (N = 0),
there is a probability ¸ per unit time that a bidder will show up, reducing the probability
that the system remains empty by ¸. On the other hand, if there is one bidder in the system
(N = 1), there is a probability ¹ per unit time that a bidder will leave it and bring it to state
0. Together, these factors imply (25). More generally, if there are currently N bidders in the
system, there is a probability ¸ per unit time that a bidder will arrive and bring it to state
N + 1, and a probability N¹ that one of the bidders will leave it and bring it to state N ¡ 1.
On the other hand, if the system is in state N ¡1, there is a probability ¸ that one bidder will
arrive and bring the system to state N. Finally, if there are N +1 bidders in the system, there
is a probability (N + 1)¹ that one of the bidders will depart. This then implies (26).

















N=0 zNqN(t), this equation can be rewritten as
@Q
@t
+ ¹(z ¡ 1)
@Q
@z
= ¸(z ¡ 1)Q (28)
This equation can then be solved with the initial condition that there are no bidders at time









To determine the state probabilities at time t, qN(t), take a Taylor series expansion of Q around
z = 0, holding t constant. The probability of state N will be proportional to the coeﬃcients of
















































































Deﬁning ˜ ¸(t) = ¸
¹(1¡e¡¹t), the state probabilities (33) can be recognized as those of a Poisson





which is the result used in the text.
23B Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Immediate by solving the condition ΠS = ¸
®+¸ (p¤(1 ¡ F(p¤)) + F(p¤)R) > R for ®.
Proof of Proposition 2











































(¼N+1 ¡ ¼N) > 0 (36)
To establish concavity of ¼(˜ ¸), diﬀerentiate ¼ one more time to obtain
@2¼














































Grouping terms of like powers of ˜ ¸ and using the concavity of ¼N then yields
@2¼






(¼N+2 ¡ 2¼N+1 + ¼N) < 0 (38)
Proof of Proposition 3
To establish that the seller prefers not to auction the good if ® ¸ ¸
R v
p (J(y)¡R)f(y)dy
R , it suﬃces
to show that if this condition is met, @ΠA=@T · 0 at T = 0 and is nonincreasing thereafter.


























¡˜ ¸(T)(1¡F(y))(J(y) ¡ R)
³
1 ¡ ˜ ¸(T)(1 ¡ F(y))
´
f(y)dy (40)











(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy (41)












(J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy ¡ ®R · 0 (42)
Solving for ® then establishes the condition for optimality of no sale. In order to establish that
no other T can yield a higher expected revenue, it suﬃces to show that ΠA is concave in T.
Note that
@2ΠA




















Using the concavity of ¼ and ˜ ¸, the term in parentheses is negative. But this implies that at
any point where @ΠA=@T = 0, ΠA is concave in T, implying that all T such that @ΠA=@T = 0
must be maxima. As ΠA is (weakly) decreasing at T = 0, it cannot reach a maximum for some
T > 0 without ﬁrst reaching a minimum. As there can be no such minima, ΠA can have no
maxima other than T ¤ = 0 either, implying that T ¤ = 0 is the unique optimal “selling” strategy




Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that whenever ® < ®¤, ΠA is increasing in T at T = 0, and that ΠA(0) = R > 0.







¡®T¼(˜ ¸(T)) = 0 < ΠA(0) (44)
To establish uniqueness, it suﬃces to show that ΠA is concave in T for all T such that
@ΠA=@T = 0, a result that was already derived in the proof of proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 5
Note that for all T > 0, @ΠA=@® = ¡Te¡®T¼(˜ ¸) < 0, @ΠA=@¹ = e¡®T(@¼=@˜ ¸)(@˜ ¸=@¹) < 0
and @ΠA=@¸ = e¡®T(@¼=@˜ ¸)(@˜ ¸=@¸) > 0. Therefore, the claimed relationships must hold as
well for the optimal T ¤.
25Proof of Proposition 6













and we have shown in proposition 4 that @2ΠA=@T 2 < 0 whenever @ΠA=@T = 0, the sign of




























¡®T¼ < 0 (46)
Since ˜ ¸(T) is monotone increasing in T, this implies that d˜ ¸=d® < 0.
B. Arrival rate ¸






Next, observe that by concavity of ¼, Φ(˜ ¸) = (@¼=@˜ ¸)=¼ is a strictly decreasing function of ˜ ¸.
Using the fact that @˜ ¸=@T = ¸e¡¹T = ¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹, (47) can be rewritten as
Φ(˜ ¸)(¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹) = ® (48)





(Φ0(˜ ¸)(¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹) ¡ ¹Φ(˜ ¸))
> 0 (49)
C. Drop-out rate ¹
As in the proof for ¸, rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition as Φ(˜ ¸)(¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹) = ®. Applying the





(Φ0(˜ ¸)(¸ ¡ ˜ ¸¹) ¡ ¹Φ(˜ ¸))
< 0 (50)
Proof of Proposition 7









26Using the fact that ˜ ¸ = ¸
¹(1 ¡ e¡¹T) for ¹ 6= 0 and ˜ ¸ = ¸T for ¹ = 0, we have T = ¡ln(1 ¡
˜ ¸¹=¸)=¹ for ¹ 6= 0 and T = ˜ ¸=¸ for ¹ = 0. Thus, e¡®T =
³
1 ¡ ˜ ¸¹=¸
´®=¹
for ¹ 6= 0 and e¡®˜ ¸=¸
for ¹ = 0. Substituting into (51), the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 8
Auctioning will be optimal if
ΠA(T) = e
























+ ˜ ¸(T)(1 ¡ e
®T)¼1 + (¼0 ¡ e
®T¼1) > 0 (54)
Now, choose T small enough such that ¼2 ¡ e®T¼1 > 0, i.e. T < ln(¼2=¼1)=® (this assumption
is innocuous, as if the auction dominates for that “arbitrarily” chosen T, it will necessarily
do so for the optimal T ¤ as well), and consider the limit as ¸ ! 1, which for constant T
implies ˜ ¸(T) ! 1. The summation term contains only positive terms by construction and
therefore tends to plus inﬁnity in polynomial progression, whereas the second term tends to
minus inﬁnity linearly and the third term is constant. Therefore, for constant T, the whole
expression tends to plus inﬁnity as ¸ ! 1, and the auction will be preferred to the store for
large enough ¸.
Proof of Proposition 9
Since ® < ®¤, we know that the seller’s expected utility from running the store is ΠS > R, so
all we need to show is that for ¹ high enough, he will achieve at most R using an auction. Note
that for all T, lim¹!1 ˜ ¸(T) = 0, so it follows from (16) that for all T ¸ 0, lim¹!1 ΠA(T) =
e¡®TR · R, and the store is therefore strictly preferred to the auction if ¹ is suﬃciently high.
The uniqueness of the critical ¹0 follows from the fact that ΠA is strictly decreasing in ¹ for
all T > 0 while ΠS does not depend on ¹.
Proof of Proposition 10


























¤ ¡ R)(1 ¡ F(p
¤)) ¡ ®R) (56)
Using the deﬁnition of g(˜ ¸) and the fact that
R v
p (J(y) ¡ R)f(y)dy = (p¤ ¡ R)(1 ¡ F(p¤)), the
result follows.
Proof of Proposition 11
Noting that ˜ ¸ = ¸
¹(1¡e¡¹T) < ¸=¹ and using the result of Proposition 10 and the fact that
























Proof of Proposition 12
Note that when ® ! 0, the payoﬀ from the store is ΠS = ¼1, whereas the payoﬀ from the
auction is ¼(˜ ¸(T)) =
P1
N=0 e¡˜ ¸(T) ˜ ¸(T)N
N! ¼N. Also, since ¸ À ¹, ˜ ¸ can be made suﬃciently large
so that ¼(˜ ¸) > ¼1 by setting a large auction closing time T. Therefore, using arguments similar
to those in the proof of proposition 8, one can establish that the auction dominates for low ®.
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